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9EVIDENCE

part before he can require specific performance on the part of the purchaser. Furnishing the septic tank easement was considered to be a
material act.
The seller argued that even if he could not be granted specific performance the purchaser was liable for the loss under the doctrine of equitable conversion. The court of appeals ruled against this contention. It
set forth the following prerequisites for an equitable conversion of real
property: (1) the seller must have fulfilled all conditions; (2) the seller
must be entitled to specific performance; and (3) the parties by their
contract must have intended that title pass to the purchaser upon the signing of the contract of sale. The court held that none of these requirements had been met in the Sanford case.
PHILLIP A. RANNEY

EVIDENCE*
Numerous rulings in this field were handed down during the period
covered by this survey. The paragraphs below set forth cases which seem
most significant or interesting.
ADMISSIBILITY

Expert Testimony
In Piotrowski v. Corey Hospital' plaintiff's attorney introduced into
evidence a copy of a medical journal which criticized the treatment of
plaintiff's decedent by defendant's doctor. Plaintiff's decedent entered
defendant hospital as a patient and was delivered of a child by Caeserean
section. Because of postoperative pulmonary difficulties the attending
physician, who was also the superintendent of defendant hospital, prescribed administration of oxygen. While the tank which supplied the
necessary oxygen was being replaced with a full one, plaintiff's decedent
died as a result of being deprived of much-needed oxygen for a period of
approximately twenty minutes.
The medical case was discussed and criticized in the August, 1958
issue of the Ohio State Medical Journal, published prior to the trial of
the case. The article contained a critique of the method used in treating
the decedent and concluded that death could have been prevented by
changes both in anesthetic techniques and immediate postoperative care.
* This article was written by Ivan L Otto with the guidance of Samuel Sonenfield, formerly
Assodate Professor of Law at Western Reserve Law School.
1. 172 Ohio St. 61, 173 NB.2d 355 (1961).
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Having elicited from the attending physician agreement with part of the
conclusion of the article, plaintiff's counsel offered into evidence a copy
of the journal with passages favorable to the plaintiff underlined in ink.
It was admitted over the objection of defendant's counsel. The jury returned a verdict in the sum of $50,000 - the amount prayed for in the
plaintiff's petition.
The supreme court reversed the judgment and remanded the case,
holding that "medical and other scientific treatises representing inductive
reasoning are inadmissible as independent evidence of the theories and
opinions therein expressed."' The basis for such exclusion is the lack of
opportunity to cross-examine, lack of certainty as to the validity of the
conclusion expressed, and technicality of language.
The decision is in line with the general rule.' Particular difficulties
arise in the instant case, however, in that as the writers of the critique
were unnamed and probably unavailable, plaintiff's sole evidence regarding accepted practice was inadmissible, even though he put on the stand
a physician who testified to a causal relationship between the lack of
oxygen and the decedent's death. Furthermore, since the physician himself admitted agreement with at least part of the conclusion of the journal,
the harm perpetrated is not too clear, as the lack of opportunity to crossexamine does not appear prejudicial. This evidence could have been admissible as an admission or a declaration against interest. In reversing,
the court also placed emphasis on the lack of unanimity of the jury, the
verdict being equal to the prayer, and on the underlining in the journal.
Since each of these items separately is not sufficient grounds for reversal,
it is submitted that all taken together ought not to be either.
Privileged Communications
opinion 4

In another
the supreme court redefined the extent of the attorney-dient privilege. The case involved a will contest, in which plaintiffs called an attorney as a witness to testify regarding the testator's competence to dictate a will. He had been asked to draw a will for the testator, but, in fact, had never done so. The trial court refused to admit the
testimony, on the lawyer's claim of privilege. The court of appeals reversed the ruling on the ground that the testimony sought to be elicited
was not within the purview of the concept of privilege.'
In reversing the court of appeals, the supreme court held that in order
to encourage total disclosure by the client, information gained through
2.
3.
See
4.
5.

Id. at 69, 173 N.E.2d at 360.
See, e.g., Hallworth v. Republic Steel Co., 153 Ohio St. 349, 91 N.E.2d 690 (1950).
generally 20 AM. JU1R Evidence § 968 (1939); 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 718 (1942).
Taylor v. Sheldon, 172 Ohio St. 118, 173 N.E.2d 892 (1961).
See OrIo REv. CODE § 2317.02.
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the mere seeking of an attorney's services is to be regarded as privileged.
Furthermore, observations made by the attorney under such circumstances
come within the concept of communication.
is thus somewhat restricted.

The rule in Bahl v. Byal6

Results of Lie Detector Tests
In State v. Smith7 the Lucas County Court of Appeals reaffirmed the
courts' distrust of lie detector tests. The court followed Parkerv. Friendt,s
a civil case, in holding that such results are inadmissible because unreliable. The present decision goes further and holds that evidence of willingness or lack thereof to take a lie detector test is equally inadmissible.
PriorGuilty Plea
In Wilcox v. Gregory the Summit County Court of Appeals ruled
that a plea of guilty in the Wadsworth Mayor's Court may be introduced
in the corresponding civil suit. The problem had an interesting ramification. The mayor's court records were so inadequate that a conflict
arose as to whether there had been a finding of or a plea of guilty.
By statute"0 and case rule,". pleas of guilty are admissible as declarations against interest, but are not conclusive evidence of the facts constituting negligence. The court of appeals approved the trial court's instruction that whether there had been a plea was a question for the jury
and if the jury found by the preponderance of evidence that there was,
the jury should consider it accordingly as an admission. The judgment
for defendant in the civil case was affirmed.
PriorConviction
Is a former conviction of driving while intoxicated admissible to challenge the defendant's credibility in a subsequent trial for another such
offense? The supreme court, in resolving a conflict between this case'
and an Erie County opinion,'" held that it is. The defendant argued that
the former conviction was inadmissible because the offense was not a
6. 90 Ohio St. 129, 106 NE. 766 (1914). This case held that it was competent for a
physician to express an opinion as to the actual condition of the patient's mind, founded on
his study and observation while in professional attendance.
7. 113 Ohio App. 461, 178 N.E.2d 605 (1960).
8. 99 Ohio App. 329, 118 N.E.2d 216 (1954).
9. 112 Ohio App. 516, 176 N.E.2d 523 (1960).
10. OHIo REv. CODE § 1.16.
11. Clinger v. Duncan, 166 Ohio St. 216, 141 N.E.2d 156 (1957); Freas v. Sullivan, 130
Ohio St. 486, 200 N.E. 639 (1936).
12. State v. Murdock, 172 Ohio St. 221, 174 N.E.2d 543 (1961). See also discussion in
Criminal Law section, p. 460 supra.
13. State v. Hickman, 102 Ohio App. 78, 141 N.E.2d 202 (1956).

WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[VoL 13:3

crimen falsi. Although the court accepted the rule of the Kornreich
case' 4 that the cross-examination of a witness regarding credibility is to
be confined to treason, felony, and crimen falsi, it held that driving while
intoxicated was a proper matter affecting credibility inasmuch as it came
within the compass of the term "crime" under the Code.
The section of the Code referred to provides that no person is disqualified as a witness by reason of a prior conviction of a crime."5 However, it states that such conviction may be shown to affect credibility.
Prior Accidents
In Coyle v. Beryl's Motor Hotel 6 plaintiff slipped and fell in defendant's bath tub. She sought to introduce evidence regarding prior
accidents in defendant motel's tubs. The appellate court upheld the trial
court's exclusion of evidence regarding tubs in other bathrooms of the
motel and held that to show a dangerous condition through prior accidents, plaintiff would have had to show prior accidents in the same tub.
The question of whether the rule is not unduly narrow still remains, however. Ought not plaintiff be permitted to show that defendant had similar tubs in other rooms and other accidents?
OTHER AREAS

Specifications of Negligence
The danger of pleading specifications of negligence and attempting
to introduce evidence outside their scope was pointed out in Kroger Company v. McCarty." This Preble County Court of Appeals opinion held
that evidence as to speed introduced generally, without a limiting instruction, when the amended petition merely charges defendant with driving
over the center-line, is grounds for reversal.
The court followed an older court of appeals decision' 8 in limiting
the plaintiff to his specifications. The court termed the failure to limit
the evidence to the issue of damages prejudicial error.
Questioning the Jury
Interrogatories of the jury under Ohio Revised Code section 2315.16
gained added importance through a recent supreme court decision."
Questions of the jury relating to plaintiff's contributory negligence were
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Kornreich v. Industrial Fire Ins. Co., 132 Ohio St. 78, 5 N.E.2d 153 (1936).
See OHIo REV. CODE § 2945.42.
171 N.E.2d 355 (Ohio Ct. App. 1961).
111 Ohio App. 362, 172 N.E.2d 463 (1960).
O'Leary v. Pennsylvania R.R., 127 N.E.2d 877 (Ohio Ct. App. 1941).
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Niemiec, 172 Ohio St. 53, 173 N.E.2d 118 (1961).

